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Abstract
Information systems are used in overt and covert conflict and information operations target an opponent’s
ability to manage information in support of operations for political, commercial and military advantage. System
level attacks are complicated by logistic problems that require resources, command and control. Node level
attacks are practical but of limited value. Collocated equipment comprises a temporary node that may be
feasibly attacked. Estimation of IW operation merits may founder on the difficulty of predicting the net benefit
for the costs. Starting from with Shannon’s model, a simple costbenefit model is discussed. Existing models are
extended by an IW attack classification. A notional attack on system hardware is discussed with some defensive
measures.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Industrialised warfare, characterised as ‘absolute war’ in 1832 by Clausewitz, is material and labour intensive.
The creation of armed services comprising millions of combatants and auxiliaries required organisation of
labour and materiel with corresponding levels of management. With conflicting requirements and limited
resources, efficient allocation is important. For example, operations research (OR) is ‘the science of planning
and executing an operation to make the most economical use of the resources available.’ (Macksey and
Woodhouse, 1991, p. 18) Taha notes the importance of human (people) aspects (Taha, 1992, p. 2). It is noted
that efficient resource usage may depend on a wide range of criteria including information and people. Logistic
management relies on information management that currently relies on electronic information technology.
Modern ‘Information Warfare’ (IW) targets the information assets and infrastructure of an opponent in overt and
covert operations. (Waller, 1995) Waltz describes three essential information infrastructure security properties as
‘availability, integrity and confidentiality’ with respective IW objectives as ‘disruption or denial, corruption
and exploitation’. (Waltz, 1998, pp.2223)
However, IW operations require realistic assessments where military necessity is modified by external influences
made powerful by information systems. In spite of IW opportunities, the existing constraints of armed conflict
seem to be applicable in that ‘Information Warfare weapons must meet the same tests for necessity and
proportionality as other weapons under the laws of armed conflict.’ (Kuschner, 1998; Yurcik, 1997)
Ignatieff, discussing ‘Virtual War’ or war with precision weapons and strong media component, suggests ‘By
1999, military lawyers had been integrated into every phase of the air campaign, including the finalisation of the
air tasking orders which assigned pilots to specific targets and missions.’ (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 197) He continues,
‘But legal imperatives combined with public expectation are driving warfare towards 100 percent precision
weapon use.’ (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 198)

It is noted that substantial information systems are needed for such operations and are also the target of such
operations.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The Shannon Model (Slepian, 1974, pp. 529) describes fundamental characteristics of a communication system.
The Transmitter sends the message in the channel to the Receiver. The channel is subject to inherent ‘noise’ that
can be from natural and human sources. This model describes information flow between nodes and underpins
associated analytic techniques.
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Figure 2 Lasswell – Braddock Model
Other models restate the basic Shannon relationship in various ways. Lasswell, speaking of Mass
Communication, in 1948 stated ‘A convenient way to describe an act of communication is to answer the
following questions: Who? Says What? In Which Channel? To Whom? With What Effect?’. This was extended
by Braddock who interposes “Under What Circumstances? For What purpose?”. (McQuail and Windahl, 1981,
pp.1011)
The De Fleur model includes both transmission and reception ‘Shannon’ channels, addresses
feedback and shows that noise is applied to all system components. (McQuail and Windahl, 1981, p.13)
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Figure 3 Comparison of Shannon and LasswellBraddock Models
LasswellBraddock can be recast as a ‘Shannon Model’; however, it also addresses the intent and effect of the
communication.
Shannon models may be concatenated to describe more complex systems or decomposed to show increasing
detail. System characteristics include the probabilities of the correct message being received and bandwidth
(Bytes per second) may measure information transfer between Sender and Receiver. It is noted that Transfer

Functions for each channel and node may become very complex in real world systems. However, the interface
between node and channel is suitable for observing, measuring or interfering with messages.

CLASSIFYING ATTACKS ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Information security is primarily concerned on how to prevent or detect misconduct in informationbased
systems though information may have no physical existence. According to Stallings (Stallings, 1998), “a
computer system or network are best categorised by viewing the function of the computer system as providing
information. In general, there is a flow of information from one source… to a destination”. Additionally, the
model may be applied to any system where there is an exchange of information (Figure 4) and it complies with
the Waltz objectives.
While this model depicts information exchange and possible attack scenarios there is a high level of abstraction.
Interruption (Figure 4b) attacks availability when a system asset is destroyed, unavailable or unusable.
Interception (Figure 4c) attacks confidentiality when an unauthorised party gains access to an asset.
Modification (Figure 4d) attacks integrity when unauthorised parties gain access and also tamper with an asset.
Fabrication (Figure 4e) attacks authenticity when unauthorised party successfully inserts counterfeit objects into
the system.
Fisch and White bridge these gaps with ‘Assessment Theory’ where ‘the goals of a risk assessment are to
identify the areas of a computer or network that are most susceptible to compromise and to determine the most
appropriate protection for these areas’. (Fisch and White, 2000) A threat measurement is presented with three
binary classes (8 categories): Hostility, Sophistication and Source.
While it is less abstract than Stallings and offers greater detail by including the attacker intention (hostile versus
nonhostile), the complexity (sophisticated versus unsophisticated) and threat source (internal or external), it
does not explicitly address what, who, and by what means.
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Figure 4 Security Threats According to Stallings
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Figure 5 Interference Model for Information System
However, Stallingstype activities can be arranged in order of effect on information and message validity. For
this paper, these ‘interferences’ (Figure 5) are defined as I0 or Normal transmission, I1, Interception, I2,
Modification, I3, Fabrication and I4 as Interruption. Communication between the transmitter (T) and receiver
(R ) has noise (N) from all sources and intentional interference (I).
Kahn discusses the options available to the sender who may hide the message form (steganography), hide the
message meaning (cryptography), hide the source and destination (traffic security) and/or hide the route taken
(emission security) (Kahn, 1996, p. xviii). It is proposed that a message meeting these criteria is resistant to
Stallings type activities.
Cost-Benefit
Bandwidth may be defined in terms of clock speed, data path width and efficiency (Maj and Veal, 2001, p. 2).
Of note, ‘Efficiency’ is defined in terms of clock cycles to transfer information in bytes. This may be viewed as
benefit (bits transferred) against cost (clock cycles required) where message size is affected by hardware
implementations (eg pipelining), coding (eg ASCII) and communication protocols (eg RS232) with error
detection/correction capabilities.
We define two parameters as ’Feasibility’, an estimate however reached, and ‘Efficiency’ which is ‘Benefit over
time’ divided by ‘Cost over time’. Ignoring the common time coefficient, Efficiency E = b/c = benefit divided
by cost. Given that difficulty may exist in determining benefit, estimates based on appropriate heuristics or
operational statistics may be used.
In project management, the PERT method assesses activity duration by averaging normal, best and worst
estimates. Jordan and Machefsky suggest ‘The time estimate derived from a PERT chart tends to be more
accurate than a bestguess estimate’.
(Jordan and Machefsky, 1989, p. 118)
Extending this to group
estimations, Surowiecki suggests that the average of the best guess of each group member may be more accurate
than the best guess of only the fewer, smarter group members. (Surowiecki, 2004, p. xiii) However, it relies on a
method of ‘aggregating the information of everyone in the system’ (ibid. p. 74)
Consequently, the Estimation Table (Figure 6), based on estimates of a particular IW activity may be extended to
include wider range of gradations or numeric values.
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Figure 6 Estimation Table
Considering the interference modes (I0 – I4), then costbenefit (CB) based on feasibility and efficiency
assessment may be expressed as a function of interferences, feasibilities and efficiencies. Estimation of each
interference effect in a node may produce an overall estimate on which to base decisions. This estimation may
be based on statistical, operations research, heuristic or other techniques selected for the task.
CBnode =

f1(α0I0, α1I1,α2I2,α3I 3,α4 I4) where α is a coefficient

Further, each node estimate may aggregate all the interferences for a single figure that can be combined with
other nodes for a system figure. Alternately, each node interference eg
produce a system I2 estimate.
CBsystem = f 2(CB0,

I2, may be summed across the system to

…, CBn1) or CB system Ix = f3(Ix0, …, Ixn1)

The aggregation functions selected may depend on the quality of the estimates. For example, numeric estimates
based on operational experience may be mathematically treated, while ‘belief functions allow us to base degrees

of belief for one question on probabilities for a related question.’ (Shafer, 2000, p. 1)
or heuristic methods may be suitable.

Alternately, arithmetic

An overall feasibility matrix may be completed for the system model and a reasonable metric for interference
may be node bandwidth. It is noted that system bandwidth measurement is complex and outside the scope of
this paper.
Extending a feasibility matrix for each interference on each node with better metrics may produce numbers for
analysis. For an example node, given I0 = 100% and I1 = 80%, I2 = 60%, I3 = 55% and I4 = 30%. These values
may be averaged or weighted as necessary
Alternately, should exigencies proscribe certain interference modes (αx = 0) then the model can be recast. This
numeric extension of the ‘Feasibility – Efficiency’ estimation was suggested by the paper on ‘Attack Trees’ by
Schneier (1999)
Classification
To overcome the shortcomings of Fisch and White, and Stallings, and build on the Shannon model, it is proposed
that common characteristics of any IW activity are mode, means, origin, path, destination and effect (Table 1).
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IW Activity Classification
Overt/Covert
Attack visibility
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Intrinsic/Extrinsic
Is it part of the targeted system?
Internal/External
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Figure 7 IW Activity Classification
While this classification does not explicitly address the time component of the activity, the feasibility and
efficiency (cost benefit) estimation may provide a starting point.
Information systems components can interact, for example, people can attack people, software and hardware
through activities such as assaults, hacking, theft and damage. Software attacks include identity theft, erroneous
code, Trojan horse, virus, worm and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. All of these attacks have
been documented (Hutchinson and Warren (2001); Denning (1999); Schwartau (1996)).
Schwartau discusses ‘Chipping’ seen as unauthorised modification to electronic components to attack a system,
though research to date indicates little in general access on successful or implemented chipping operations.
However, ‘chipping’ can be seen as an extension of traditional sabotage techniques or normal crime.
Counterfeiting expensive components or substitution of cheap components for commercial gain is not new.
Further, an incident, if detected at all, may be treated as ‘caveat emptor’ rather than an incipient IW operation.
Counterfeiting of expensive components is prevalent (Chesterman and Lipman, 1988) and with short operational
life cycles (24 years) of conventional computer equipment, a substandard component may not be detected unless
it causes noticeable problems. For example, network interface cards (NICs) are relatively cheap and readily
available, investigation into poor performance may not be financially viable.
Modification Attacks on Information Systems
Shannon and Weaver’s information system model comprises information source, transmitter, receiver and
destination. (McQuail and Windahl, 1981) Detectable noise, in this model, is inherent in the system, is
internally applied and affects the information transferred across the system. ‘Noise’ may also be described as a
‘modification’ in that it may alter information content. Adding noise to a system may be the intentional result of
electronic warfare (EW) jamming operations and may be classed as a Stallings type modification.

We propose a minor change to include additional modification sources to indicate where IW attacks may be
made.
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Figure 8 Shannon and Weaver Model with Additional Modification Sources
A distributed information system comprises nodes containing components; components include people,
hardware and software. In a distributed system such as a public communications infrastructure, component
attacks may be mere nuisance countered with technological changes and system management. For example,
public phones may be replaced by mobile phones or relocated into attended public areas. Node attacks, such as
a telephone exchange may be countered by backup facilities and rerouting traffic around the damaged node.
System attacks require sufficient resources to mount and coordinate attacks to minimise the use of technological
changes, redeployment, backup facilities or message rerouting.
A simple model such as the ‘Lanchestertype combat model’ (Giordano and Weir, 1985, pp. 369376) shows how
initial resource levels and competitor efficiency interact. Given few attackers and many nodes, the attackers need
to be very effective to damage enough nodes to incapacitate a system. Consequently, only node level attacks
may currently be considered feasible.
In special circumstances, such as collocation in manufacture, storage or transit, ‘System’ attacks may be made.
However, collocation increases defence efficiency with unimpeded access and concentration of resources.
Further, replacement systems may be readily available.
One possible IW attack on system hardware is the use of substandard components during the construction, repair
and upgrade phases of a project.
The crime of counterfeiting highvalue components is widespread
(Chesterman and Lipman, 1988) and may include the use of substandard materials to maximise profits.
Common project management methods include ‘JustInTime’ (JIT) techniques where minimal inventories
depend on reliable vendor supply (Bartol and Martin, 1991, pp. 655656). Manufacturers may use brokers for
some component services but verifying component provenance may be difficult. Further, seeking compensation
for direct and indirect costs of the substandard components may be difficult.

A Notional Modification Attack on a Collocated Distributed System
Given that distribution logistically complicates a system wide attack and collocation simplifies the attack but
increases defender’s effectiveness, a surreptitious attack may be considered.
In an IW context, a system attack
through substandard components may create disruption or damage but may be detected by existing Quality
Management techniques (Blanchard, 2004, p. 40). Substandard components, while ostensibly for profit
maximisation, may be an intentional attack on a system. However, ‘pseudostandard’ components (nominally
identical to normal components) may contain additional functionality. This attack is described as ‘Chipping’
(Schwartau 1996; Maxwell, 2004) and as a ‘System Containing Unauthorised Modifications’ (Shaw, 1995).
The hardwarebased unauthorised modification (UM) has four phases, Replication, Introduction, Initiation and
Manipulation. The softwarebased attack (Virus) usually requires introduction prior to replication.

Silicon foundries may provide design and construction services. A functionally equivalent design with desired
modifications lawfully acquired might only need relabelling to complete replication. Consequently, we can
classify this attack as a ‘covert, hardware, intrinsic, internal, hardware attack with overt or covert effects’.
Some commentators suggest that the introduction is the difficult part of the attack. (Maxwell, 2004) However,
if the system operators are targeted, then a belief that an attack has occurred (overt, hardware, intrinsic, external,
people, overt) may be achieved by managed detection of an UM. This may provoke the system operators into
costly defensive measures to achieve the desired results. For example, additional time and resources spent
dealing with normal faults may be exacerbated by the UM perception.
However, in both these cases, the storage and distribution network may provide introduction opportunities where
components may be inserted or swapped in store or transit during legitimate system manufacture. Initiation
may be based on system parameters such as clock cycles or event counts and manipulation may be as simple as
bit inversion at irregular intervals in the system operation.

Replication

Introduction
Initiation
Manipulation

PseudoStandard Hardware Modification
Plan the attack (select the targeted system, node and component)
Design an appropriate modification
Create sufficient instances of the modified targeted components
Insert the modified components into the target system
Internal eg elapsed time, logical expression
External eg trigger event, software feature, virus
Disruption (interrupt or intercept) exercise interrupts, clear/set registers
Alteration (modify or fabricate) bit inversion, failure to clear registers
Destruction, alter feedback, blow fuses, damage circuit boards
Figure 7 Hardware Modification Process

Example of Notional Attack
A proposed train traffic control system component detects the presence of a train on a track section by detecting
the wheels making contact with both tracks. Different track sections give indication of train position and speed.
Using ‘majority voting’ for safety, three parallel components are compared and any two of three are considered
to be the correct output and the dissenting output is isolated. Reliability analysis (Blanchard, 2004, p.103) may
indicate that concurrent failures may be very unlikely.
If the modified chip inverts one output channel then this will be ignored. However, two channels or more failing
simultaneously may produce an error accepted as valid. In some critical systems, the isolated system may
receive prompt maintenance to ensure system availability but a simultaneous failure may not be rectified.
The UM attack against user confidence occurs through impeding system usage not destroying trains though this
may occur. Continued safe operation may require slowing the trains to maximise driver response time and
minimise damage. However, customers may find alternate transport if the trains are late, slow or considered
unsafe. Further, maintenance staff may be overworked responding to any perceived irregularity with the control
system. The result will be primarily economic such as lost business, reduced efficiency and increased costs.
Further, public perceptions altered by a high profile failure may take a long time to correct.
Defensive Practices
Ensuring quality may become a substantial problem for all concerned in component manufacture, handling and
use. It may become practical to include rigorous personnel selection, testing and licensing coupled to effective
workplace policies for component storage and handling. Contractual requirements need to clearly define
responsibility as well as verification and certification of design and materials. Traditional Quality Assurance
techniques may be extended to ensure that hardware attacks are detected or prevented.

In addition to process changes, component records and associated information need be kept. Requirements for
records management systems include written policies, training and support, system controls, access controls,
system audit trails, routine and regular testing of hardware and software and adequate security. Additionally,
there are Australian standards relating to record management practices. (AS15489, 2002) Further, electronic
records are now readily admissible in support of legal argument. These records must be maintained in suitable
manner to permit such use.
Ongoing logistic support includes reliability analysis and estimates spares requirements to maintain system
reliability, however, these estimates may be insufficient to counter an UM attack. ‘Major factors involved in this
process are (1) the reliability of the item to be spared. (2) the quantity of items used (3) the required probability
that a spare will be available when needed (4) the criticality of item application with regard to mission success,
and (5) cost.’ (Blanchard, 2004, pp. 102103) An unforeseen or unconsidered factor in the calculations may
adversely affect maintenance, system serviceability and mission availability at any time during the service life.
It is noted that part of a new critical system acquisition process includes logistic support analysis to identify the
necessary spare parts needed. While current storage and warehousing techniques will maintain the stock
availability, the store itself may be targeted by a hardware UM attack. Additionally, these spare parts may need
tamperresistant packaging and secure storage to minimise the opportunity for tampering or theft.
These requirements may increase the cost of manufacture, transport and storage of components. Additionally,
records may need to prove compliance, contest legal proceedings as well as locate the spares as needed. The
Record Manager may need to demonstrate that the relevant information can be found and used for whatever
purpose and that the records are reliable. This may extend to the information technology itself with management
of hardware, software and associated operating information.
In time of conflict, the supply of necessary materials may require substantial facilities, information systems and
intellectual property.
A nation dependent on electronics may need to maintain a complete design and
fabrication capability to ensure that hardware attacks are not effective.
This raises concern over ‘Trusted’ manufactures where products are commonly obtained from commercial
sources, often based overseas. Local manufacture of desired items may breach commercial licensing and
intellectual property rights.
While reparations may be made after the fact, obtaining the information and
infrastructure to commence manufacture may be difficult. Technology transfer may be affected by national
policies on areas as disparate as education, globalisation and environment.
However, while existing policies and practices may be extended into trusted manufacture, the costs must be
borne as part of the overall cost of producing or operating the system. This may adversely affect the efficiency
and cost effectiveness of the system and in some cases the system will never be built.

CONCLUSION
Information system models may be used to determine system liability to attack. Attacks may be classified by
source, channel and destination. Attack feasibility and efficiency estimates may be based on heuristics or
empirical knowledge. An attack against operator confidence in a system may occur through using substandard
components in a system. Components may be modified to produce errors in response to stimuli.
All components are modifiable at some stage and from many sources to produce an unauthorised modification
with effects ranging from almost undetectable to catastrophic. Improved security in storage, transport and
packaging can limit the opportunities to introduce modifications. However, costs of ensuring component quality
may become a substantial problem.
Ensuring component supply for critical systems may require major investment in resources, diplomacy and
business negotiations. ‘Trusted’ manufacture to ensure continued supply of mission critical components may be
very costly if intellectual property, technology transfer and political considerations are included. These costs
must be considered in the design and implementation of any critical system.
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